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Judicial review of such statutory and constitutional issues is fully
in accord with the institutional expertise of the judiciary and the role
that courts are expected to play in our constitutional system. Ever since
Marbury v. Madison, it is "emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act or 1996 Act) creates a deli-
cate balance between the roles of state regulatory commissions (state
commission(s)) 2 and federal courts in ensuring interconnectivity between
incumbent local service providers and their new competitors. While state
commissions have primary regulatory authority, federal judicial review
safeguards the rights of parties who disagree with the state commission's
interpretation of the Act.
Federal courts are appropriate venues for review of interconnection
agreements. Federal review increases consistency among local service ar-
eas and provides minimum standards for the industry. In addition, federal
court judges are less susceptible to local interest and influence-especially
the powerful influence of an incumbent service provider who likely has a
long-term relationship with a state commission or with state legislators.
Federal judicial review of state-approved interconnection agreements
raises important issues of state sovereignty and immunity, concepts
grounded in the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.3
Eleventh Amendment immunity is an effective bar to federal court juris-
diction over suits against states as originally granted in Article Three of the
Constitution.4
1. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 435 (1993)
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
2. The term "state regulatory commission" refers to agencies or other entities of state
executive governments responsible for regulating telecommunications carriers.
3. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States... to Controversies between two or more
States;---between a State and Citizens of another State;-between citizens of different
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States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit is not absolute
however. Three alternatives exist for avoiding state immunity and the re-
sulting bar to federal court jurisdiction. First, as a sovereign entity, a state
may always consent to suit, thereby waiving immunity. Second, in limited
circumstances, Congress can abrogate state immunity when enacting leg-
islation. The Supreme Court requires that Congress explicitly express its
intent to abrogate immunity and that Congress act pursuant to an appropri-
ate source of power when it does so. Finally, without a state's consent or
an abrogation of immunity by Congress, a litigant may bring a suit against
a state official for prospective relief under the doctrine of Exparte Young.
According to the generally settled' framework of Eleventh Amend-
ment law described above, Congress abrogated state immunity when it en-
acted the 1996 Telecommunications Act.7 By all known standards, the fed-
eral judicial review provisions of the Act were enforceable against states at
the time of enactment.
However, in April of 1996, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida' and modified essentially the entire framework
of Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence. In one sweeping deci-
sion, the Court severely limited the application of the doctrine of Ex parte
Young and removed an important source of congressional power to abro-
gate state immunity. Only state consent to suit, through a waiver of immu-
nity, remains intact. The full effect of this decision has yet to been seen. It
is clear, however, that the decision creates a vacuum of unenforceable
rights granted to citizens by federal statutes.
The 1996 Act does not escape the fate of the other statutes enacted by
Congress under the Commerce Clause9 with an explicit abrogation of state
immunity. In the case of the Act, the resulting inability of a federal court to
secure jurisdiction will have unfortunate consequences for many citizens.
Congress's attempt to place regulatory control in state commissions cou-
pled with the Supreme Court's zealous effort to protect state immunity will
States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6. The Author acknowledges the continuing debate over the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment and the resulting implications for federal court jurisdiction. However, as this
important discussion is outside the scope of this Note, the argument presumes the state of
Eleventh Amendment immunity is as the Supreme Court described in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
8. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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increase costs of interconnection-costs eventually passed on to consum-
ers-and delay the entry of competition in the local service market.
This Note argues that, despite the Supreme Court's affinity for state
immunity, federal court review of interconnection agreements is essential
to the balance of power between state and federal governments in the
emerging local telephony market. In Part II, this Note examines the role of
state commissions in creating interconnection agreements under the Act.
Part III discusses implications of the Seminole Tribe decision on federal
judicial review provisions of the Act. The inapplicability of the Ex parte
Young exception to such suits is discussed in Part IV. Part V suggests that
while state consent to suit is still a viable option for securing jurisdiction,
that consent cannot be inferred from state commission participation. In
Part VI, this Note asserts that the pragmatic effects of litigation over an
interconnection agreement can result in federal court jurisdiction over state
action, though the effect of the Seminole Tribe decision will unduly ham-
per enforcement efforts. Finally, a more appropriate response to the immu-
nity concerns raised by federal judicial review of state action is offered:
federal courts' use of a deferential standard of review.
II. INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENTS UNDER THE 1996 ACT
A. Provisions for Interconnection
The 1996 Act provides guidelines for introducing competition into
local telephone markets. In particular, section 251 of the Act imposes a
duty on incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) "to interconnect di-
rectly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommu-
nication carriers.' ' These ILECs are required to provide, at just and rea-
sonable rates, interconnection with their networks for the transmission and
routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access at any feasible
point within the ILECs' networks." The Act also prohibits technological
barriers to interconnection, '2 encourages consumer-friendly accommoda-
tions, such as number portability, 3 and imposes a duty to negotiate in good
faith with other carriers to reach interconnection agreements.
4
While the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) is charged with developing regulations for the implementation of the
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(a)(1).
11. Thomas J. Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1,
17; 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(2).
12. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(a)(2).
13. Id. § 251(b)(2).
14. Id. § 251(c)(1).
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Act,' 5 state commission oversight and regulation is expressly warranted
both in the ability to enforce the state commissions' own policies, orders,
or regulations and the state commissions' final authority to approve inter-
connection agreements. State commissions are to "determine whether the
rates for interconnection are just and reasonable, a determination that must
be 'based on the cost (determined without reference to rate-of-return or
other rate-based proceeding of providing the interconnection,' but may
include a reasonable profit.'
B. The Role for State Commissions
Upon receiving a request for interconnection, the incumbent ILEC
may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with a requesting carrier.
All negotiated agreements must be submitted for approval to the state
commission:
The state commission may reject the negotiated agreement within 90
days, but only if it concludes, with written findings... that the agree-
ment discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a party to
the agreement or that the implementation of the agreement is not con-
sistent with the public interest, convenience, or necessity.'8
The Act provides for arbitration, mediation, and negotiation proce-
dures in cases where parties cannot reach negotiated agreements.19 At any
point in voluntary negotiations, a party can ask the state commission to
mediate differences," and from the 135th to the 160th day after a request
for negotiation, any party can seek binding arbitration from the state com-
mission.2' The state commission is required to settle each unresolved issue
no later than nine months after the date of the first request for negotia-
tion.22 The arbitrated agreement must then be approved by the state com-
15. Id. § 251(d)(1). Note that the FCC is currently under a stay issued by the Eighth
Circuit preventing it from imposing its regulations on ILECs or state regulatory agencies.
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct.
429 (1996).
16. Commission oversight is executed through the requirement that parties requesting
interconnection notify the commission; commission monitoring of the negotiating process;
and the commission's ultimate authority to approve or reject agreements. 47 U.S.C.A. §
252(e)(1). In addition, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(3) preserves state access regulations, and 47
U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(3) preserves state authority to establish and enforce other requirements
of state law in review of the agreements.
17. PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 SPECIAL REPORT
26 (1996) (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d)(1) (1996)).
18. Id. at 27 (explaining 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(2)).
19. 47 U.S.C.A. § 252.
20. Id. § 252(a)(2).
21. Id. § 252(b)(1).
22. Id. § 252(b)(4)(C).
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mission which 'may reject the agreement only if it does not meet the new
access and interconnection obligations imposed by section 251 or the
pricing standards of section 252(d). 7 If the state commission fails to ap-
prove or reject the agreement, or carry out any of its other duties under the
Act, the FCC shall issue an order preempting the state commission's juris-
diction over that proceeding or matter within ninety days of being notified
of such failure.24
If a party to an agreement disagrees with the state commission's de-
termination in approving or rejecting the agreement, the Act provides a ju-
dicial remedy for parties. Any party aggrieved by an interconnection
agreement approved by the state commission as described above, may
bring a claim in the federal district court.2z The Act bars state courts from
hearing complaints under the Act and limits relief in federal court to a de-
termination of whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements
of the Act.
2 16
While the language of the Act clearly articulates a role for judicial
review in this process, the ability of a federal court to review state com-
mission action is no longer as simple as the language of the Act implies.
The Supreme Court's recent expansion of the Eleventh Amendment bar on
suits against a state will prevent parties from suing state commissions di-
rectly.
III. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE
The doctrine of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amend-
ment limits a civil litigant's ability to sue a state.27 "[A]n unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as
well as by citizens of another state. 28
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress has the ability to ab-
rogate a state's immunity through legislation if it explicitly indicates its
29intent in a statute and acts under proper authority. Prior to the SupremeCourt's decision in Seminole Tribe, "proper authority" included the Com-
23. Id. § 252(e)(2)(B).
24. Id. § 251(e)(5).
25. Id. § 252(e)(6).
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
28. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (citation
omitted).
29. The Court used a two part test: "first whether Congress has 'unequivocally ex-
presse[d] its intent to abrogate immunity' and second, whether Congress has acted
'pursuant to a valid exercise of power."' Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123
(1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. Masour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
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merce Clause of the Constitution.3" However in April of 1996, two months
after the Telecommunications Act was passed, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Seminole Tribe and severely limited
Congressional power to abrogate state immunity.
A. The Test for Abrogating State Immunity
The test for determining whether a state's immunity has been effec-
tively abrogated has two components: first, whether Congress explicitly
intended to open states to suit when it enacted a law; and second, whether
Congress acted under a valid exercise of power.3  Within the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act (IGRA), Congress expressly provides for judicial in-
tervention through the federal court system. The Act authorizes a tribe to
compel a state's good faith negotiation in gaming agreements by bringing
it before a federal district court. In Seminole Tribe, the Court found that
this statutory language satisfies the explicitness requirement.32
The second part of the test focuses on whether Congress acted under
a valid exercise of power when it abrogated state immunity. The IGRA
was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause." This clause, ac-
cording to the Court, does not grant Congress the power to abrogate states'
immunity.3 4 The Court's determination that Congress did not properly ab-
rogate state immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause rendered the
IGRA unenforceable in federal court.
Prior to the Seminole Tribe decision, both the Commerce Clause35
and the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress with valid sources of
power to abrogate state immunity." Relying on the Supreme Court's prior
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 37 Congress abrogated state
immunity through the Commerce Clause power in several federal statutes
including the Fair Labor Standards Act,3' the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Responsibility Cleanup Liability Act,39 and the 1996 Telecommu-
30. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1988).
31. Green v. Masour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
32. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
33. Id. at 1119.
34. Id. at 1126-27.
35. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States...." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
36. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
37. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996).
38. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
39. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
nications Act.4° However, the Court noted in Seminole Tribe that the
Commerce Clause was indistinguishable from the Indian Commerce
41Clause, implying that it, too, is not a valid source of abrogation power.
By removing an important source of congressional power to abrogate state
immunity, the Court effectively limited citizens' ability to sue states under
many federally declared causes of action.
In overturning Union Gas, the Court noted several reasons for devi-
42ating from the usually binding precedent of previous decisions. First, the
Court suggested that the Union Gas decision was of questionable prece-
dential value because the majority of the Court disagreed with the rationale
of the plurality decision.43 Next, the Court asserted that review of the deci-
sion was appropriate because the case involved an interpretation of the
Constitution which is only subject to review by the Court or Constitutional
Amendment. Until either event, Congress was bound to act within the
Court's previous interpretation. 44 Finally, review was important because
the result in Union Gas and the plurality's reasoning departed from the
Court's established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment. 45 The
Court declined to follow the doctrine of stare decisis in this case and over-
ruled Union Gas and along with it, limited Congress's authority to abro-
gate state immunity.
Federal district courts applying the Seminole Tribe holding have
found states immune from suit in federal court without their consent.46 The
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1994)).
40. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
41. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126 (1996).
42. Id. at 1128.
43. Four Justices joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Union Gas, with Justice White
concurring in the judgment, but writing separately to indicate his disagreement with the
majority's rationale. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45. Justice Stevens, the only remaining mem-
ber of the Union Gas plurality, filed a dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe. Seminole
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 ( Stevens J., dissenting).
44. "Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been 'particularly true in
constitutional cases because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practi-
cally impossible .... Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
45. The Court argued throughout Seminole Tribe that the Union Gas decision was the
exception rather than the rule in Eleventh Amendment analysis. "Never before the decision
in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Con-
gress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
46. See, e.g., Blow v. Kansas, 929 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Kan. 1996) (suit brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act); Chauvin v. Louisiana, 937 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. La. 1996)
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Court's decision already has severely limited the ability of citizens to seek
redress from a state under many federal laws, and seems likely to prevent
suits under the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
B. The 1996 Act After Seminole Tribe
The Court's holding in Seminole Tribe extends state immunity and
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over state commissions. Using the
Green v. Masour 7 two-part test for determining whether a state's immu-
nity has been properly abrogated by Congress under a federal law, the Act
can overcome only the first requirement of an explicit declaration by Con-
gress of its intent to abrogate immunity. Congress explicitly provided par-
ties to interconnection agreements an avenue for judicial review in the fed-st 48
eral courts satisfying the first part of the test. The statute clearly indicates
Congress's intent for federal judicial review of state commission action in
the language of section 252(e)(6), "[i]n any case in which a State commis-
sion makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such
determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district
court .... .
However, the Act was passed pursuant to Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. After Seminole Tribe, the Com-
merce Clause is no longer a valid source of abrogation power. Despite the
fact that at the time the Act was passed, the Commerce Clause was consid-
ered a valid source of power, the Court's decision a few months later nulli-
fied Congress's explicit intent to abrogate state immunity.
IV. THE EXPARTE YouNG EXCEPTION TO ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
Ex parte Young has long been an exception to state immunity's bar
on claims against a state. Where the relief sought is prospective in nature,
such as an injunction, a federal court may order a state official in his or her
individual capacity to act or cease an action without offending the state's
immunity. In suits under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the exception
(suit brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Cal. Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996) (suit brought under the Clean Water
Act); Prisco v. New York, 1996 WL 596546 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suit brought under
CERCLA); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Amoco Corp. 1996 WL 264707 (N.D. 11. 1996) (suit brought
under Federal Patent Laws).
47. Green, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 252(e)(6), 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(6)
(West Supp. 1997). In fact, Congress left open review only in federal court when it specifi-
cally banned suits in state court under the Act.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
is no longer available to preserve suits against state actors. The Supreme
Court's Seminole Tribe analysis of a congressionally provided remedial
scheme can be applied to the Act and will prevent a court from finding ju-
risdiction over a state actor.
A. The Ex parte Young Exception
The Ex parte Young doctrine permits a lawsuit against a state where
the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise prevent it, provided that the
named party is the state official in his or her individual capacity rather than
the state itself." In addition, the relief sought must be injunctive, instead of
relief which would require payment from the state treasury.
5 1
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that a federal court's in-
junction preventing a state officer from enforcing a state statute that alleg-
edly violated the Fourteenth Amendment was not prohibited by the Elev-
enth Amendment. 2 If an officer acts in a manner in conflict with the
superior authority of the Constitution, he or she is "stripped of his [or her]
official position"" or representative character and is thus not entitled to the
grant of immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment. This distinction is
largely an acceptance of the fiction that the suit in that case is against a
private party rather than the state. 4
The balance between supremacy and sovereignty concerns is at the
heart of the Ex parte Young doctrine. "As Justice Brennan has observed,
'Exparte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize
the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of
rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.' 55 "The doctrine
of Ex parte Young is based on the idea that the power of federal courts to
enjoin continuing violations of federal law is necessary to vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." 
56
In Edelman v. Jordan,57 the Court held that when a plaintiff sued a
state alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an
injunction that governs the official's future conduct.5 The Jordan Court's
50. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
51. Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Su-
preme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2246 (1996).
52. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984).
53. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
54. Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 2246.
55. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 105 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
56. SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1996).
57. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
58. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 102-103 (noting the Jordan clarification of availability of
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emphasis on the distinction between prospective and retroactive relief has
become an integral part of the Ex parte Young doctrine by fulfilling "the
underlying purpose of Exparte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States."' 9
B. Seminole Tribe's Remedial Scheme Analysis
The Court in Seminole Tribe declined to find the Exparte Young ex-
ception available in the suit against Florida." Despite petitioners' argu-
ment that the Exparte Young doctrine could be applied to their case where
the governor had been named individually and the relief sought was pro-
spective--an order to negotiate with the tribe in good faith-the Court up-
held the governor's immunity as a state officer. The Court's reasoning fo-
cused on Congress's insertion of a remedial process in the statute itself.
The Court held that Congress could not have intended to subject states to
the full range of relief available in federal court where it provided for lim-
ited remedies in the text.6 "Where Congress has created a remedial
scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits
against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one cre-
ated by the judiciary."62 The Court cautioned lower courts to hesitate be-
fore casting aside statutory limitations by permitting an action against a
state officer based on Ex parte Young for the enforcement of a statutorily
created right.
63
The Indian Gaming Regulation Act provided that where a court finds
that the state has failed to negotiate in good faith, the remedy available was
an order directing the state and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact
within sixty days.6 If the parties disregarded the court's order, each party
would then have to submit a proposed compact to a mediator. If the state
failed to accept the compact, the mediator would be required to notify the
Secretary of the Interior, who would then provide regulation.65
The total result of the remedial scheme in the IGRA would subject
only prospective relief; see also, Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 95 F. 3d
1359, 1365 (1996)).
59. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 106.
60. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996).
61. Id. at 1132 (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,423 (1988)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Court fails to explain from whom a tribe is to secure this order if a federal
court is not available. Presumably a state court would not be available either, as the Con-
stitutional defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity as depicted by the Court would likely
apply in state court as well.
65. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
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the state only to an order to negotiate, which if ignored, would result in
regulation of Indian gaming by the Secretary of the Interior. The Court
found the limited remedy available to tribes compelling, and based its
limitation of the Exparte Young doctrine on its existence in the statute.
Despite the broad definition of remedial scheme employed by the
Court, lower courts have declined to limit Exparte Young's application by
distinguishing the language found to constitute a "remedial scheme" in the
IGRA from language found in other federal statutes." The "gloss on Ex
parte Young does not affect the statutes in the present action whose reme-
dial schemes are not similar to the one provided for in the IGRA.
67
The above distinction is not well founded and certainly susceptible to
contrary interpretation. The Court in Seminole Tribe described the limita-
tion on federal court review as a "remedial scheme., 68 The Court's char-
acterization of a remedial scheme can be applied to any statute where
Congress has described or indicated the types of remedies available from
courts. Any insertion by Congress of a limitation on the scope of federal
court review, or the types of remedies available, fits the remedial scheme
definition of Seminole Tribe.
C. The Remedial Scheme Analysis Prevents an Exparte Young
Exception Under the 1996 Act
Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Ex parte Young doctrine would have
been a useful tool in preserving federal court jurisdiction over states. Suits
by aggrieved parties to interconnection agreements could have named state
officers such as regulatory commissioners or directors instead of the state
itself. In accordance with the Act, the suits could have sought prospective
relief in the form of an injunction preventing the state from enforcing an
agreement found to be contrary to the provisions of the statute.
However, after Seminole Tribe, the Ex parte Young exception is not
available in suits under statutes where Congress has provided a "remedial
scheme., 69 The Court's description of what constitutes a remedial scheme
and its application of this definition to the IGRA effectively eliminate the
possibility of getting around state immunity in any statute where Congress
has limited the type of judicial remedy available to litigants, as it has in the
1996 Act.
A remedial scheme, similar to the one found persuasive in the IGRA,
exists in the 1996 Act. The Act specifically limits the relief available in a
66. Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp 963 (D. Mass. 1996).
67. Id. at 982.
68. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
69. Id. at 1132-33.
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federal district court to a determination by the federal court that "the
agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title
and this section."7 A court in this instance is likely to decline to apply the
Exparte Young exception on the same grounds as the Supreme Court did
in Seminole Tribe. Because the full authority of the federal court in an Ex
parte Young suit could expose the state regulators to more severe action
than anticipated by section 252(e)(6), a district court, in light of Seminole
Tribe, will determine whether Exparte Young is unavailable.
Ex parte Young, as refined by the Seminole Tribe remedial scheme
analysis, fails to provide an exception to the Eleventh Amendment for
cases arising under section 252(e)(6) of the Act.7' According to Seminole
Tribe, where Congress has expressly indicated the type of relief available,
the full jurisdictional power of the federal judiciary cannot be unleashed
on state actors.72 It is likely that courts will refrain from applying the Ex
parte Young exception to cases under the Act, and state immunity will be
preserved.
V. STATE CONSENT TO SUIT
The only alternative to the Eleventh Amendment's bar to federal ju-
risdiction remaining untouched by the Seminole Tribe decision is the abil-
ity of a state to waive immunity and consent to suit. However, where par-
ties are challenging state commission regulatory action, this result depends
upon the discretion of the state to provide an explicit agreement to the suit
in federal court. Just as Congress is required to provide explicit indication
of its intent to abrogate state immunity, so must a state provide an une-
quivocal expression of its consent to the suit when it waives immunity.
State consent to suit cannot be inferred from state action or participa-
tion in a federal program.73 Constructive consent is not a doctrine com-
monly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights.74 As with all
constitutionally protected rights, Eleventh Amendment immunity is not to
be taken lightly. Thus, a clear statement waiving immunity must precede
federal court jurisdiction.
Despite instruction from the Supreme Court on this issue, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the
70. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 252(e)(6), 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(6)(West Supp. 1997).
71. Strahan, 939 F. Supp. at 982; see also Henry Paul Monoghan, The Sovereign Im-
munity 'Exception, 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 129-30 (1996).
72. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
73. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
74. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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State of Washington and its regulatory commission consented to suit when
it undertook the arbitration of the interconnection agreement between the
incumbent carrier and the entering carrier.75 The court found that the
"overwhelming implication" of the statutory structure of the Act is that
Congress conditioned state participation in the interconnection agreement
negotiation, arbitration, and approval process on consent to federal judicial
review of the state's participatory actions.76
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington focused on the "overwhelming implication" language found origi-
nally in the Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.
77
and repeated in numerous cases involving immunity issues. The case be-
fore the Supreme Court in Wilson Distilling involved the interpretation of
a state statute. Wilson Distilling argued that the State of South Carolina
intended to divest itself of its property rights when it created a state com-
mission to regulate liquor. It was further argued that the state intended to
consent to court jurisdiction over the state property and the commission.
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that an interpretation of the statute
avoiding state immunity "could only be warranted if exacted by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implication from the
text .... ,78
The District Court for the Western District of Washington failed to
note the crucial difference between the Wilson Distilling case and the case
before it, US West Communications. The Supreme Court was interpreting a
statute passed by the South Carolina legislature---an expression of the
state. The district court was interpreting the Act--an expression of Con-
gress. Congressional explicitness in its intent to abrogate immunity is not
the same as the required expression on the part of the state indicating its
intent to waive immunity. The "overwhelming implication" of the lan-
guage of the Act suggests Congress intended to abrogate state immunity at
a time when such abrogation was sanctioned by the Supreme Court. To
extend the "overwhelming implication" of language drafted by Congress to
any of the fifty states who regulate local telephone markets, is to take the
Supreme Court's enunciated standard out of context. While it is true that
the Supreme Court itself has used the phrase inexactly, the Court has never
supported a finding that a state consented to suit through participation in a
federal program with the phrase "overwhelming implication." The decision
by the District Court for the Western District of Washington is unsup-
75. US West Comm., Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Wash. 1997).
76. Id. at 1368.
77. Wilson Distilling, 213 U.S. 151 (1909).
78. Id. at 171.
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ported by any previous Supreme Court decision. Further, federalism and
state sovereignty require that states be held to their own expressions, not
those of Congress.
Finally, it is illogical to read the Act as a manifestation of Congress's
intent to condition state commission participation on state consent to suit.
At the time the Act was passed, Congress had good reason to believe it
could abrogate state immunity by an explicit statement of its intent to do
so and by acting pursuant to proper authority, which, at that time, included
the Commerce Clause. Even if Congress could condition participation on a
consent to suit-a condition never previously recognized by the Supreme
Court-it is an illogical interpretation of the Act given the legal context.
Without an expression of a state commission's consent to suit under the
Act, federal courts are incapable of securing jurisdiction over state com-
missions.
VI. THE END RUN AROUND STATE IMMUNITY: LIMITED AND
COSTLY FEDERAL REVIEW AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE
Federal judicial review of interconnection agreements is an essential
step in achieving the fair and competitive state of telephony the Act envi-
sions. Without it, the Act's careful balance between regulation and com-
petition, as well as between federal and state power, is lost. Judicial review
is also essential to the larger scheme of checks and balances on each of the
three branches of government, and to the more precarious balance between
federal and state authority.
In an effort to decentralize telecommunication regulation, Congress
looked to state involvement in the process of integrating competition in lo-
cal markets. However, Congress explicitly reserved a federal role in the
process through FCC oversight and federal court review of agreements.
The Supreme Court's Seminole Tribe decision erodes Congressional abro-
gation and limits the application of Ex parte Young, thereby eliminating
two important means of obtaining federal jurisdiction over states. How-
ever, even after the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, intercon-
necting parties may still be able to seek a limited form of federal judicial
review of state commission action in approving interconnection agree-
ments. Unfortunately, this review will come at a higher cost to providers
and consumers than would otherwise be necessary.
A. Preserving Federal Judicial Review in the Context of Litigation
The pragmatic result of litigation under the Act provides federal
courts with jurisdiction to review the agreement despite their inability to
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secure jurisdiction over state commissions." Parties who disagree with a
state commission's approval or rejection of an agreement have the option
of suing the other party to the interconnection agreement in federal district
court.
While these suits will likely name the state regulatory commission as
a defendant initially, the commission will quickly be dismissed if it raises
immunity as a bar to jurisdiction. Parties to the agreement will then be left
to present their case before a federal judge. The resulting judicial review is
effectively what Congress intended to take place, even though the parties
are not those it intended.
Congress explicitly outlined the scope of federal court review: to de-
termine "whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of
section 251 of this title and this section."80 This determination can be made
with the carriers as litigants. However, it is clear that the review by a fed-
eral court will be limited by several factors. First, the court will not benefit
from hearing from the state commission the rationale behind its decision.
Carriers will likely attempt to explain the state commission's action to the
court; however, because of their interest in the result, it will be skewed to
reflect the outcome each desires. Neither party could better explain the
state commission's rationale than the state commission itself.
In addition, state commissions on some level represent the interests
of the citizen consumers of the state. Presumably, a state commission's de-
cision is based on what is best for the local service market and its consum-
ers. State citizen interests should be presented to the federal court for con-
sideration in its review of the agreement.
State commissions are important parties in interconnection litigation.
They represent state-wide interests, and consumer interests-interests not
represented by interconnecting parties. Congress intended for these im-
portant interests to be presented to and considered by reviewing federal
courts.
B. Lack of Jurisdiction Creates Enforcement Problems
Despite federal court ability to review interconnection agreements
without state commissions as parties, enforcement issues arise once review
is completed. If a court determines that an agreement does not meet the re-
79. The result of integrating competition into local telephone markets is that two pri-
vate companies who disagree, can seek review in court. They are not bound to the adminis-
trative appeal process as was the case when the FCC or a state commission regulated a sin-
gle service provider.
80. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 252(e)(6), 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e)(6)
(West Supp. 1997).
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quirements of the Act, it is not clear what remedy is available to litigants.
Prior to Seminole Tribe, a court could have issued an injunction against the
state commission or a declaration of an agreement's noncompliance or-
dering the state commission to arbitrate a new agreement. After Seminole
Tribe, the above remedies are not available because a federal court lacks
jurisdiction and therefore, the power to issue an effective order against a
state commission.
Carriers, both incumbent and entering, are bound by the interconnec-
tion requirements of the Act. While a court could direct the parties to reach
a new interconnection agreement consistent with the Act, the new agree-
ment would still be subject to state commission approval if the state com-
mission chooses to act. Because a court may not compel a state commis-
sion to approve an agreement, the commission could reject the new
agreement reached by the carriers. Even after long and expensive litiga-
tion, carriers are not assured of a satisfactory result. The tug-of-war be-
tween state commission and federal court authority could continue indefi-
nitely.
C. A Better Solution: Federal Court Deference to State
Commission Decisions
A more appropriate resolution for state sovereignty concerns rests in
the maintenance of federal court jurisdiction and federal court use of a def-
erential standard of review. Use of a deferential standard of review in
evaluating interconnection agreements comports with congressional intent,
respects the discretion and expertise of the state commission, and avoids
insulting state sovereignty concerns. This solution requires a return to the
pre-Seminole Tribe understanding of the Eleventh Amendment.
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
the Supreme Court identified the appropriate restraint a court should dem-
onstrate in cases of agency interpretation: an agency's decision should not
be disregarded unless it is impermissible under the statute. 81 A court may
not substitute its own construction of a statute if the agency's interpreta-
tion is reasonable.82 While this decision applied to federal review of a fed-
eral agency action, it is equally applicable and possibly more appropriate
in cases of federal court review of state commission action.
Deference to state commission action is especially appropriate where
a conscious, legislative decision has been made to vest state commissions,
rather than the FCC, with primary authority to implement the Act. Where
81. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
82. Id. at 843-44.
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Congress has delegated policy-making authority to a state commission, the
extent of judicial review of the state commission's determinations is lim-
ited.83 Federalism concerns and legislative intent caution federal courts
away from re-deciding these cases on their merits rather than deferring to
state commissions' expertise.
Judicial restraint and deference to agency determinations under the
Act preserve state authority over competitors in local telephone markets.
The delicate balance between state authority and interconnecting parties'
ability to preserve their rights through judicial intervention is best
achieved with deferential judicial review.
VII. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to vest regulatory control in states, Congress provided
state commissions with the opportunity to give final approval of intercon-
nection agreements. To balance state authority, Congress provided for fed-
eral judicial review for parties who disagree with state commission deci-
sions. In a pre-Seminole Tribe world, this explicit indication of
congressional intent would have preserved federal judicial review for par-
ties in disagreement with the agency.
Congress's intent to preserve federal judicial review of state commis-
sion action within the new regulatory scheme of the Act is not thwarted by
recent Supreme Court federalism concerns and its expansion of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine.84 Congress's intent and the process of judicial re-
view are, however, severely limited by the state commission's absence
from litigation.
The balance of power that Congress imposed on the process of intro-
ducing competition preserves both state regulatory authority and the par-
ties' ability to seek review and possible redress from the federal judiciary.
This result would properly serve congressional intent for implementation
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
83. Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).
84. The proper judicial review can be obtained in the 1996 Telecommunications Act
because the agreement subject to review is between two private parties. However, many
other federal laws enacted under the Commerce Clause will be unenforceable against a state
party.
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